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We explore the effects of mandatory third-party review of mortgage contracts on the terms, availability, 
and performance of mortgage credit. Our study is based on a legislative experiment in which the State of 
Illinois required “high-risk” mortgage applicants acquiring or refinancing properties in 10 specific zip 
codes to submit loan offers from state-licensed lenders to review by HUD-certified financial counselors. 
We document that the legislation led to declines in both the supply of and demand for credit in the treated 
areas. Controlling for the salient characteristics of the remaining borrowers and lenders, we find that the 
ex post default rates among counseled low-FICO-score borrowers were about 4.5 percentage points lower 
than those among similar borrowers in the control group. We attribute this result to actions of lenders 
responding to the presence of external review and, to a lesser extent, to counseled borrowers renegotiating 
their loan terms. We also find that the legislation pushed some borrowers to choose less risky loan 
products in order to avoid counseling. 
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§ Office of the Comptroller of the Currency1. Introduction 
In the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, policymakers have been urged to increase 
their intervention in credit markets (see Sheila Bair’s testimony to the House Financial Services 
Committee, 2007). In particular, the leading policy initiatives include tightening the oversight on 
lenders (Federal Truth in Lending Act, Regulation Z) and providing mandatory financial 
counseling to certain borrowers (President Obama’s Homeownership Affordability and Stability 
Plan of 2009). Although it has been shown that these programs may slow down market activity 
(Bates and Van Zandt, 2007), their effects on mortgage choice and performance, and their 
overall effectiveness are still debated.  
In this paper we study the effects of the legislative mandate for third-party review of 
mortgage contracts implemented in a pilot program in Cook County, Illinois, between September 
2006 and January 2007. The program required “high-risk” mortgage applicants acquiring or 
refinancing properties in 10 Chicago zip codes to submit loan offers from state-licensed lenders 
to review by loan counselors certified by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD). The same requirement applied to applicants who chose certain mortgage products 
deemed risky by legislators. The empirical setting of this legislative natural experiment allows us 
to study the program’s outcomes and isolate the driving forces behind the effects.  
In particular, the unorthodox geographic focus of the legislation offers a way to identify 
the control and treatment groups for econometric analysis of mandatory counseling. In contrast 
to loan-based programs, the geographic mandate makes it nearly impossible for lenders and 
households to disguise the terms of the transaction to eschew the regulation. Consequently, we 
construct a control group similar to the treatment area in terms of pre-pilot sociodemographic 
measures, foreclosure rates, as well as borrower and mortgage characteristics to conduct 
difference-in-differences analyses.
1 Since the legislation applied only to a select group of 
financial intermediaries and borrowers, we are able to derive further identification from variation 
in loan terms and performance within zip codes at given points in time. 
                                                 
1 Our results are robust to alternative control group specifications. 
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of low- and moderate-income households and on lender response to mandatory loan counseling 
programs. In particular, we find that mandatory counseling hampered real estate market activity 
in the treated areas. In the 10 pilot zip codes, the legislation caused up to a 73% drop in the 
number of mortgage loan applications for the lenders who were subject to the legislation.  
Our key result is that the legislation resulted in substantially lower ex post default rates 
and somewhat better loan choices among some of the counseled borrowers that remained in the 
market. These results hold after controlling for improvements in the credit quality of the 
borrower pool and for changes in the composition of the pool of available lenders. Specifically, 
the 18-month default rate among low-FICO-score counseled borrowers was about 4.5 percentage 
points lower than that among similar borrowers in the control group (the average pre-treatment 
default rate of such borrowers in both the treatment and control groups was 17 percent). As we 
discuss below, these borrowers could not eschew counseling by modifying their product choice. 
Financial counseling mandates are often thought to work by providing better information 
to financially unsophisticated households. However, such mandates often have another important 
aspect in that they subject financial intermediaries to a certain degree of oversight by an outside 
party. In the case studied here, the legislation interjected counselors into the loan application 
process. This provided an incentive for lenders to screen out lower-quality borrowers in order to 
protect themselves from possible legal and regulatory action. On balance, we find more evidence 
in support of the effectiveness of the oversight threat than information per se.  
 In particular, we obtain mixed support for the direct effect of information received in 
counseling sessions. Based on individual counseling records of one agency, we estimate a 
stronger propensity to renegotiate loan terms for borrowers who are advised that their loans are 
unaffordable, as compared to ones for whom the counselor finds no issues with the loan offer.
2 
Yet, we detect almost no aggregate effect of counseling on interest rates, debt leverage, and 
                                                 
2 This analysis is carried out on a small subsample of counseled borrowers that were hand-matched with the Cook 
County Deeds data and mortgage servicer records. We are working on obtaining access to the aggregate data on pre- 
and post-counseling session mortgage terms.  
  3propensity by the counseled borrowers to take out adjustable rate hybrid mortgages or mortgages 
with prepayment penalty—the most common areas of concern for counseling agencies. 
We find stronger evidence for indirect effects of the counseling requirement on mortgage 
origination and mortgage decision making. First, we document a spike in rejection rates of 
mortgage applications by lenders who are subject to the legislation during the treatment period, 
with rejection rates returning to their normal level as soon as the law is rescinded. This pattern is 
partially due to the temporary exit of lenders with loose screening practices from the treated area, 
and it is partially due to tighter screening by the remaining lenders. Second, we find a sizable 
decline in the prevalence of low-documentation mortgages. We attribute this change to 
counselors’ demand that borrowers bring their income documentation to the counseling session. 
Both of these responses are consistent with the hypothesis that third-party review of mortgage 
offers led to more thorough screening—what we refer to as the oversight effect. Third, we find 
that borrowers who could avoid counseling by selecting less risky products did so. Fourth, we 
report that counseled borrowers rejected fewer mortgage offers. Since we do not detect an 
aggregate improvement in loan terms, it is possible that borrowers give up shopping around for 
mortgages to avoid additional counseling sessions.  The latter two responses are consistent with 
borrowers’ desire to avoid the transaction costs of fulfilling the counseling mandate—that is, the 
burden effect. 
In general, our results suggest that the threat of oversight and the imposition of 
transaction and compliance costs of counseling, rather than the information contained in 
counseling sessions, served as the primary catalyst for change in borrower decision making and 
in lender behavior, ultimately leading to lower default rates. However, one should be careful not 
to interpret these results as a verdict on the general ability of financial counseling to convey 
useful information to borrowers.
3 Rather, as discussed in greater detail below, the design of this 
particular pilot featured considerable incentives for lenders to shy away from certain borrowers 
                                                 
3 For instance, a recent volume (Lusardi, 2008) offers evidence for effectiveness of targeted, long-term financial 
education programs in improving financial literacy and stimulating savings.  
  4and products. Further, by designating certain contracts as triggers for counseling, the pilot design 
also conveyed information about their desirability outside of counseling sessions themselves. 
Our paper contributes to two strands of research on the effect of mortgage choice on 
housing market outcomes. The first stresses the role of financial education in enabling more 
informed choices by households.
4 For instance, Lusardi (2007, 2008) voices concern that many 
consumers who enter into complex financial contracts, such as mortgages, are financially 
illiterate. Households may borrow too much at a high rate without realizing future consequences 
(Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson, 2007) or may have a hard time recalling the terms of 
their mortgage contracts (Bucks and Pence, 2008). Moore (2003) and Lusardi and Tufano (2009) 
finds that respondents with poor financial literacy are more likely to have costly mortgages. It 
has also been argued that insufficient financial sophistication contributed to a growing number of 
households in bankruptcy and foreclosure when housing market conditions deteriorated (White, 
2007). Stark and Choplin (2009) present survey evidence that borrowers fail to read and 
understand contracts. Although there is a shared sense that household financial literacy is 
inadequate and the resulting mistakes are consequential, there is less agreement on whether 
financial education programs are an effective means of addressing this shortcoming.
5    
The second strand focuses on regulatory oversight and corresponding changes in 
incentives for various market participants. For instance, Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009) 
show that the incentives associated with the securitization process result in lax screening by 
mortgage originators. Ben-David (2008) finds that intermediaries expand the mortgage market 
by helping otherwise ineligible borrowers to engage in misrepresentation of asset valuations to 
obtain larger mortgages. Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2008) show that soft information about borrowers 
                                                 
4 This literature is motivated by Bernheim (1995, 1998), who was among the first to document low levels of 
financial literacy among consumers. One of the starkest illustrations of shortfalls in financial literacy was 
demonstrated by Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 2008) who provided evidence of consumer inability to perform even 
simple interest-rate calculations. Lusardi and Tufano (2009) report similar concerns with household debt literacy. 
5 For instance, Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2001) find that high school financial education mandates have an 
appreciable effect on asset accumulation later in life. However, a recent paper by Cole and Shastry (2008) that uses a 
larger dataset and a different empirical specification fails to detect any effect of such programs on household 
participation in financial markets. 
  5is lost as the chain of intermediaries in the origination process becomes longer, leading to a 
decline in quality of originated mortgages. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the mandatory 
counseling program in detail. In Section 3, we outline our methodology and the data we used to 
test the hypotheses. We present empirical results on the effects of the program on the mortgage 
market in Section 4. In Section 5, we evaluate the relative importance of different channels in 
attaining these effects. We summarize and discuss policy implications in Section 6. 
 
2. Illinois Predatory Lending Database Pilot Program (HB 4050) 
2.1 Description of the Pilot Program 
In 2005, the Illinois legislature passed a bill intended to curtail predatory lending.   
Although the state had a number of anti-predatory provisions in place, they were based on loan 
characteristics, in line with prevailing practices elsewhere in the country. Some political leaders 
in Illinois became concerned at the apparent ease with which trigger criteria for anti-predatory 
programs could be avoided by creative loan packaging. For instance, balloon mortgages targeted 
by regulations were replaced with adjustable rate mortgages (or ARMs) with short fixed rate 
periods and steep rate reset slopes (the so-called 2/28 and 3/27 hybrid ARMs).
6 Consequently, 
the legislature sought to shift focus from policing loan issuers to educating the borrowers. 
To that effect, the legislation sponsored by the Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan 
mandated financial counseling for mortgage loan applicants whose credit scores were 
sufficiently low (or product choices were sufficiently risky) to identify them as high-risk 
borrowers. The legislation set the FICO score threshold for mandatory counseling at 620, with an 
additional provision that borrowers with FICO scores in the 621–650 range be subject for 
counseling if they chose certain high-risk mortgage products. Such mortgages were defined to 
include interest-only loans, loans with interest rate adjustments within three years, loans 
                                                 
6 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the state anti-predatory lending laws on the type of mortgage products used 
in the market, see Bostic, Chomsisengphet, Engel, McCoy, Pennington-Cross, and Wachter (2008). 
  6underwritten on the basis of stated income (low-doc loans), and repeat refinancings within the 
last 12 months. Borrowers were subject to counseling regardless of their FICO score if they took 
out loans with prepayment penalties, loans that allowed negative amortization, or loans that had 
closing costs in excess of five percent. The proposal was modeled on a successful FHA program 
run in the 1970’s (Merrick, 2007), and it generated a lot of excitement among Illinois lawmakers.  
The program was meant to run as a four-year pilot in select parts of Cook County that 
covers the metropolitan Chicago area, after which its coverage could be expanded. In spite of 
vocal opposition from community-based groups and affected lenders, Illinois politicians 
clamored to have their districts included in the pilot (Merrick, 2007). This choice looked 
particularly ironic in retrospect, given the eventual response of the population in the pilot areas. 
In the end, the bill (titled HB 4050) was passed on the last day of the 2005 legislative session. 
HB 4050 mandated that each of the high-risk borrowers attend a counseling session with 
one of the HUD-certified loan counseling agencies. The determination of the need for such a 
session was made on the day of the application, and the borrower had 10 days to fulfill the 
requirement. The goal of these sessions, lasting one to two hours, was to discuss the terms of the 
specific loan offer for a home purchase or refinancing and to explain their meaning and 
consequences to the prospective borrower. The counselors were not supposed to advise 
borrowers about their optimal mortgage choice in the sense of Campbell and Cocco (2003); 
rather, they were to warn them against common pitfalls. The counselor was also expected to 
verify the loan application information about the borrower (e.g., income and expenses). At the 
end of the session the counselor was required to record a number of findings about the loan, such 
as whether the lender charged excessive fees, whether the loan interest rate was in excess of the 
market rate, whether the borrower understood the transaction and/or could afford the loan.   
Both the interview and the independent collection of data on borrower income and 
expenses allowed counselors to form an assessment of borrower creditworthiness that potentially 
went beyond what was conveyed by the lender. Effectively, the counselors were able to elicit 
private information that was not necessarily used by lenders to make approval and/or pricing 
  7decisions and make it a matter of public record by entering their recommendations in the state-
maintained database. This may well have induced the lenders to screen better prior to referring 
approved applications to counseling for the fear of a regulatory (e.g., license revocation) or legal 
(e.g., class action lawsuits) response. It should be noted that none of the recommendations was 
binding in the sense that borrowers could always choose to proceed with the loan offer at hand. 
HB 4050 stipulated that the $300 cost of the session be borne by the mortgage originator, 
and not the borrower.
7 However, even if this were to be the case, HB 4050 imposed other time 
and psychic costs on borrowers. Finally, by lengthening the expected amount of time until 
closing, HB 4050 could force borrowers to pay for longer credit lock periods, raising loan costs.  
As mentioned earlier, only loans offered by state-licensed mortgage lenders were subject 
to this requirement, as the State lacks legal authority to regulate any federally-chartered 
institutions and generally exempts such institutions and state-chartered banks from mortgage 
licensing. However, lending in disadvantaged neighborhoods has been done primarily through 
the state-licensed mortgage bankers that presented themselves as a local and nimble alternative 
to the more traditional bank lenders.
8 Consequently, the legislation was likely to increase the 
regulatory burden on the very entities providing credit in the selected pilot areas. The possibility 
that this could result in credit rationing prompted many observers to voice concern on the 
potential effect of HB 4050 on housing values in the selected zip codes. 
HB 4050 imposed a substantial compliance burden on lenders as well. In addition to the 
cost of counseling (assuming it was not recovered through other loan charges), lenders had to 
make sure that the certification requirements of HB 4050 were implemented fully.
9 Otherwise, 
                                                 
7  There is substantial anecdotal evidence that brokers attempted to pass the $300 counseling fee to the borrowers in 
the form of higher closing costs or administrative charges (Bates and VanZandt, 2007, and personal communication 
with a number of mortgage counselors.)   
8 Using the HMDA data described in greater detail in section 3, we estimate that state-licensed mortgage bankers 
accounted for 56% of mortgage loans originations in the HB 4050 zip codes during 2005.  
9 Under HB 4050, title companies did not receive a "safe harbor" provision for “good faith compliance with the 
law.”  As a result, any clerical errors at any point in the loan application process could potentially invalidate the title, 
resulting in loss of the lender’s right to foreclose on a nonperforming loan. According to the Cook County Recorder 
of Deeds, even federally regulated lenders had to procure a certificate of exemption from HB 4050 to obtain a clean 
title. Consequently, all lenders were affected to at least some degree by the legislation. 
  8lenders could potentially lose the right to foreclose on the property. Finally, lenders reportedly 
feared losing some of their ability to steer borrowers toward high margin products. 
A report by the non-profit Housing Action Illinois (2007) summarized the counselors’ 
assessment of HB 4050. Over the course of the pilot, about 1,200 borrowers had their loan offers 
reviewed by 41 HUD-certified counselors. In 9% of the cases, mortgages were deemed to have 
indications of fraud. About half of the borrowers were advised that they could not afford the loan 
or were close to not being able to do so. For 22% of the borrowers, loan rates were determined to 
be more than 300 basis points above the market rate. For 9% of the borrowers, the counselors 
found a discrepancy between the loan documents and the verbal description of the mortgage. 
Perhaps most alarmingly, an overwhelming majority of borrowers who were receiving adjustable 
rate loans did not understand that their mortgage payment was not fixed over the life of the loan.  
The geographic focus of the legislation differed substantially from typical regulatory 
approaches that required counseling for certain loan types and did not apply uniformly to a 
particular area (Bates and Van Zandt, 2007). This feature of the legislation generated 
considerable opposition from community activists and residents and prompted several lawsuits. 
Since the selected pilot areas were overwhelmingly (82%) populated by Hispanic and African-
American residents, the selection prompted heated accusations of discriminatory intent on the 
part of lawmakers. As mortgage bankers threatened to withdraw from the pilot zip codes en 
masse, and as the rising tide of concerns about subprime mortgages began to have both demand 
and supply effects in the real estate market, the opposition to HB 4050 reached a fever pitch.
10 
The pilot program was suspended indefinitely in January 2007, after only 20 weeks of operation. 
 
2.2 How Was the Pilot Program Area Selected? 
The HB 4050 bill instructed the state regulatory body (Department of Financial and 
Professional Regulation, IDFPR) to designate a pilot area on the basis of “the high rate of 
                                                 
10 The record of a public hearing held on November 27, 2006, provides a good illustration of the acrimony 
surrounding HB 4050 (it is available at http://www.idfpr.com/newsrls/032107HB4050PublicMeeting112706.pdf). 
  9foreclosure on residential home mortgages that is primarily the result of predatory lending 
practices.” The pilot area announced by the Department in February 2006 encompassed ten 
contiguous zip codes on the southwest side of Chicago (the solid areas in Figure 1).
11 Four of 
these ten zip codes were located in Speaker Madigan’s district. 
Table 1 summarizes some of the key demographic and mortgage characteristics for the 
pilot area and the rest of the City of Chicago. The mortgage data come from the First American 
CoreLogic LoanPerformance dataset on securitized non-prime mortgages (henceforth, the LP 
data described in greater detail below). As can be seen in panel B of the table, at the time of 
IDFPR decision the selected zips indeed had substantially higher delinquency and default rates 
than the rest of the city (columns (1) and (3)). The pilot zip codes are also predominantly 
minority-populated and have much higher rates of unemployment and poverty (Panel A). A 
simple comparison of population counts and the total number of loans in the LoanPerformance 
data (Panel A) and FICO scores (Panel B) strongly suggests that the HB 4050 area has a 
disproportional share of subprime and Alt-A mortgages. 
 
2.3 Constructing a Control Group 
However, this set of pilot zip codes is far from unique in satisfying HB 4050 selection 
guidelines. We use this fact in constructing our control group that is meant to resemble the HB 
4050 zip codes in terms of their pre-treatment socioeconomic characteristics and housing market 
conditions. Such areas could plausibly be expected to experience the same changes in outcome 
variables as HB 4050 zip codes in the absence of intervention. To fulfill this goal, we move 
beyond the univariate metric of foreclosure rates to a set of measures identifying economically 
disadvantaged, inner-city neighborhoods. 
In particular, we use 2005 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) zip-code-level income 
statistics, as well as the 2000 Census shares of minority population, of those living below the 
poverty level, and the unemployment rate to identify zip codes within the City of Chicago limits 
                                                 
11 The HB 4050 zip codes are: 60620, 60621, 60623, 60628, 60629, 60632, 60636, 60638, 60643, and 60652. 
  10that have the smallest geometric distance from the HB 4050 zips.  The resulting 12-zip-code area 
is summarized in column (2) of Panel A of Table 1. The statistics in Panel B of Table 1 
corroborate our prior that the control zip codes are similar to the treated area in terms of their 
high default and delinquency rates, low borrower FICO scores, and disproportionate reliance on 
subprime mortgage products.
12 
This set of comparable zip codes (shown by the striped area in Figure 1) is used as one of 
the control samples in our empirical analysis. Judging by the spirit and the letter of stated 
legislative guidelines, these areas could have plausibly been selected for HB 4050 treatment.
13   
To further establish the empirical robustness of our analysis, we construct a synthetic 
HB4050-like area in the spirit of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). Instead of identifying a similar 
but untreated set of loans at the zip code level, we build up a comparison sample loan-by-loan by 
matching on observable loan characteristics. Specifically, for each of the loans issued in the 10-
zip HB 4050 area we look for a loan most similar to it that was issued elsewhere within the City 
of Chicago in the same month. The metric for similarity here is the geometric distance in terms 
of standardized values of the borrower’s FICO score, the loan’s debt-service-to-income (DTI), 
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, the log of home value, and the loan’s intended purpose (purchase 
or refinancing). Once a loan is matched to an HB 4050-area loan, it is removed from the set of 
potential matches and the process is repeated for the next HB 4050-area loan. The resulting 
synthetic HB 4050-like area is made up of observations from 42 out of 45 non-HB 4050 Chicago 
zip codes. Not surprisingly, more than half of the observations in this synthetic area come from 
the 12 comparable zip codes identified above on the basis of their socioeconomic characteristics. 
In subsequent analysis we will refer to the comparable zip codes and the synthetic area 
counterfactuals as the Control and the Matched samples, respectively.  
                                                 
12 In an earlier version of the paper, we used the reverse sequence for constructing the control sample.  That is, we 
built up the set of control zip codes by minimizing the distance in observed mortgage characteristics in the pre-HB 
4050 LP data.  Afterward we checked for similarity on socioeconomic characteristics of treatment and control areas.  
All of the results reported below are robust to the definition of the control area and are available upon request.  
13 The control area includes the following zip codes: 60609, 60617, 60619, 60624, 60633, 60637, 60639, 60644, 
60649, 60651, 60655, and 60827. 
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3. Data and Empirical Setup 
3.1 Data Used in the Study 
Our study relies on several complementary sources of data that cover the calendar years 
2005–2007. First, we use data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to 
assess elements of supply and demand for credit. Ideally, we would rely on the loan application 
and counseling data collected under the statutory authority of HB 4050 to analyze credit demand. 
In its absence, however, we turn to HMDA as the next best source of information on loan 
application volume, rejection rates, etc. Using information from HUD as well as hand-collected 
data, we are able to distinguish between lenders who specialize in prime and subprime loans, as 
well as between lenders that are licensed by Illinois and those who are exempt from licensing. 
Since the effects of the legislation were likely to be felt most acutely by state-licensed subprime 
lenders, we use this list to refine our analysis. Furthermore, the HMDA data allows us to 
examine how the HB 4050 affected the credit supply along the extensive margin, i.e., to identify 
lenders that left the market altogether. In addition, we use Census data and IRS data to control 
for zip-code-level characteristics of income and population composition. 
Next we employ the Cook County Recorder of Deeds database to obtain information on 
all actual transactions (mediated by agents or sold by owners) that took place in Cook County, 
including basic information about the associated mortgages.   
  We also use the LoanPerformance (LP) database to assess the effect of HB 4050 on the 
composition and performance of mortgages originated in the treated zip codes. This dataset is the 
main source of loan-level information available for subprime mortgages. According to 
LoanPerformance, its database covered over 90% of securitized subprime mortgages as of 2006. 
The database includes detailed borrower and loan information, such as FICO scores, debt-
service-to-income (DTI) and loan-to-value ratios, zip codes, and home characteristics; it also 
features mortgage terms, including maturity, product type (e.g., fixed or adjustable rate 
mortgage), interest rate, and interest rate spread. In addition, it contains information on whether a 
  12given loan has a prepayment penalty, whether negative amortization was allowed, and whether it 
required full documentation in underwriting. These and other characteristics of LP data are 
summarized in Table 1, Panel C. FICO scores are used extensively by lenders to assess borrower 
creditworthiness and set appropriate loan terms. For the purposes of our study, the FICO scores 
also allow us to determine which borrowers in the treated zip codes were automatically or 
conditionally subject to loan counseling (see the discussion in Section 2 for details).
14 
  Finally, we received a sample of counseling data from one of the agencies that provided 
counseling services during the HB 4050. The data includes information on original mortgage 
offers reviewed in 191 counseling sessions. We matched these data to the Recorder of Deeds and 
LoanPerformance datasets to identify which mortgages were originated and on what terms. We 
use this dataset to gauge the extent to which counseling had a direct effect on mortgage choice.  
 
3.2. Design of Tests: Difference-in-Differences Micro-Level Analysis 
Our empirical analysis is designed to exploit cross-sectional and temporal variation in a 
difference-in-differences framework. Specifically, our tests measure the difference in response of 
various variables (e.g., default status, loan terms, etc.) as a function of whether the loan was 
originated in a zip code subject to the mandatory counseling program. Our regressions include 
both time controls and cross-sectional controls, as in classic difference-in-differences analysis. 
Our basic specification regressions have the following form: 
(1)    Responseijt = α + β Treatmentjt + γ Time dummiest + δ Zip dummiesj +θ Controlsijt + εijt, 
where Responseijt is the loan level response variable, such as default status of loan i originated at 
time t in zip j; Treatmentjt is a dummy variable that receives the value of 1 if zip code j is subject 
                                                 
14 We replicate our results using the loan-level data from LPS Applied Analytics (formerly known as McDash 
Analytics). The LPS data contain information similar to that in LoanPerformance with the important distinction that 
it is not limited to subprime securitized loans. Since the majority of loans in HB 4050 zip codes were made to 
subprime borrowers and the vast majority of those were securitized, both databases cover substantially similar 
transactions. However, using LoanPerformance forces us to focus on the subset of loans directly affected by 
legislation by default. This allows for a sharper test of the effects of the counseling mandate and limits concerns 
about selection described more fully in Section 3.2. 
  13to mandatory counseling in month t and 0 otherwise; and Time and Zip code dummies capture 
fixed time and location effects. In all regressions, we cluster errors at the zip code level.
15 For 
each loan, the response is evaluated at only one point in time (e.g., interest rate at origination or 
default status 18 months hence). Consequently, out dataset is made up of the series of monthly 
cross-sections. The set of controls varies with the underlying data source, but it includes 
variables such as loan-to-value ratios at origination, borrower FICO score, loan interest rate, etc.  
  As is always the case with program evaluation studies, we are concerned about properly 
accounting for selection and matching effects. In particular, the set of HB 4050 zip codes is 
patently non-random, as it concentrates on low-income neighborhoods in which foreclosure rates 
were high at the outset. The problem with selecting such zip codes is that there is a possibility 
that they have different resilience to economic shocks unrelated to treatment. For example, it is 
possible that prices in low-income areas were more sensitive to the general price decline 
following the housing market peak around November 2006. 
We offer two solutions for the treatment zip code selection. First, we use the design of the 
pilot project and separate the effect of treatment across low-, mid-, and high-FICO score groups. 
Recall that all of the low-FICO borrowers (FICO score < 620) were subject to counseling, while 
the mid-FICO (scores in the 621–650 range) and the high-FICO (scores above 650) borrowers 
were counseled conditional on their mortgage contract choice. This approach retains the structure 
of standard difference-in-differences analysis while also exploiting the within-zip-code 
heterogeneity in treatment.
16  
We further interact time dummies with the log of the average zip code income, as 
reported by the IRS at an annual frequency. This allows the effects of unobservable shocks to 
                                                 
15 Clustering allows for an arbitrary covariance structure of error terms over time within each zip code and thus 
adjusts standard error estimates for serial correlation, potentially correcting a serious inference problem (Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). Depending on the sample, there are 22 or 53 zip codes in our regressions.   
16 The FICO-score-only partitioning of borrowers in treated zip codes has the advantage of being based on a 
characteristic that is exogenous to the treatment regime. As shown in section 5.4, the mandate caused a sizable move 
away from mortgage contracts that trigger counseling for mid- and high-FICO-score borrowers. We also evaluated 
an alternative specification that evaluates the effects on ex-post counseled borrowers by partitioning on both FICO 
score and observed contract choice. The results of this approach are shown in Appendix A.   
  14vary with the level of economic resources available to households in a particular zip code, further 
alleviating some of the selection concerns.
17 The regression specification that we therefore run 
is: 
(2)    Responseijt = α + β1 (Treatmentjt × Low-FICOijt) + β2 (Treatmentjt ×Mid-FICOijt)  
+ β3 (Treatmentjt × High-FICOijt)+  
+ γ (Time dummiest) + δ (Zip code dummiesj) + 
+ η (Time dummiest × log IRS incomejt) +θ Controlsijt + εijt.  
As a second solution to non-random sample selection and matching a counterfactual 
control area on only a limited set of observables, we conduct our tests using several alternative 
control groups. We first compare transactions in the treated zip codes with transactions in a 12-
zip-code control group described in section 2.3 (the Control sample).
18 We also use a synthetic 
HB 4050-like area that is constructed loan by loan, using a different set of observables for 
identification (the Matched sample also described in section 2.3). Finally, to account for self-
selection of lenders out of the treated zip codes, both the Control and the Matched samples are 
restricted to a set of lenders that remained active in the HB 4050 zip codes during treatment (the 
Control Active and Matched Active samples).
19 This part of the analysis holds the population of 
lenders constant; that is, we are identifying treatment effects unrelated to the change in lender 
composition. In each of these cases, we are evaluating the performance and characteristics of 
securitized subprime and alt-A mortgages contained in the LoanPerformance data. 
 
3.3. Summary of Testable Hypotheses 
                                                 
17 For robustness, we also evaluate a specification with a full set of time and zip code interactions. In this case, 
identification derives strictly from within-zip-code variation across borrower categories at a point in time. The main 
results remain qualitatively the same with this approach.  
18 It would be ideal to look at transactions that lie on either side of the border between HB 4050 and control zip 
codes to tease out the effect of the counseling mandate. Unfortunately, the LP data do not contain street addresses. 
19 The exact definition of an active lender is provided in section 4.1. 
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discussed earlier, HB 4050 increased the costs of engaging in mortgage transactions and 
providing lending services. For example, the program added legal uncertainty for mortgage 
lenders about their future ability to foreclose on properties in the treated area (Bates and Van 
Zandt, 2007). Consequently, we expect the legislation to restrict both the demand for and supply 
of lending, particularly in the directly affected market segments—subprime borrowers and state-
regulated mortgage bankers. These effects may be simultaneous and mutually reinforcing and 
may occur along both extensive and intensive margins (e.g., lender exit and loan rejection rates).  
Since the stated goal of the pilot program was to reduce foreclosures, we next evaluate 
the performance of transactions carried out under the new regime. If the intervention was at all 
effective, we would expect to find improvements in ex post mortgage performance among the 
counseled population, particularly low-FICO households. We subject the findings to a number of 
robustness checks on identification approach, functional form, and choice of control sample. 
The documented change in performance could come from a number of sources—e.g., exit 
of predatory lenders, removal of less creditworthy borrowers, or borrower ability to negotiate 
better loan terms or make better product choices. We evaluate each of these possibilities in turn. 
Each of the above actions could come about through a number of channels associated 
with the counseling mandate. We identify three such channels: the direct information effect of 
counseling, the burden effect of transaction costs of fulfilling the counseling requirement, and 
the oversight effect of the threat of regulatory or legal action (e.g., license revocation or class 
action lawsuits). The data and the design of the legislation allow us to test the relative 
importance of these channels. 
In particular, if HB 4050 succeeded in furnishing better information through counseling 
sessions, its effects should be most pronounced in mortgage characteristics (e.g., lower LTV and 
loan spreads) of the counseled borrowers. Absent the evidence of successful loan offer 
renegotiations, we would expect to see an increase in rejections of loan offers by the counseled 
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loan applications, since they are filed prior to any counseling. 
Information can be furnished not only through counseling sessions, but also by mere 
designation of certain products as risky in the sense that their selection triggers counseling. 
These designations are publicly known and may constitute a credible signal to avoid such 
mortgage products. If this signaling effect is at work, we would expect the incidence of risky 
product choices to decline for all FICO groups in the treated zip codes. 
In contrast, product selection can also be driven by the desire to avoid counseling and its 
associated costs. In this case, members of a given FICO group would avoid products that trigger 
counseling for their group. That is, one would expect a reduction in low-documentation loans 
among mid-FICO households, but not high-FICO ones. Similarly, both mid- and high-FICO 
households (but not low-FICO ones) would be expected to choose fewer negative amortization 
loans and mortgages with prepayment penalty.   
Turning to lenders, one possibility for their decision to exit the market is inability to 
make a profit in the presence of the $300 counseling fee. If this were the case, we would expect 
to see greater lender rejection rates for low-value loans, since lender compensation is typically 
proportional to the value of originated loans. 
Another possibility that was discussed earlier is that lenders are fearful of the 
consequences of the oversight of their actions by counselors and, implicitly, by the state. In this 
case, we would expect the lenders to tighten their screening of prospective borrowers, allowing 
fewer doubtful cases to enter the counseling process. This would be reflected in a temporary 
spike in rejection rates among the affected lenders during the HB 4050 period. Our final test of 
the oversight channel focuses on availability of low-documentation loans. Under HB 4050, 
lenders have little reason to offer low-documentation loans to any but high-FICO borrowers, 
since counseling would elicit income and expenses information and furnish it to the state-run 
database.  
These hypotheses form the backbone of the analysis in Sections 4 and 5 below.  
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4. Effects of HB 4050 on Mortgage Market Composition and Mortgage Performance 
4.1 Exit of Borrowers and Lenders 
We measure mortgage market activity in the wake of HB 4050 as the volume of loan 
applications captured in the HMDA database.
20 Figure 2a depicts the total number of loan 
applications in the treated zip codes (the solid line) and in the control set of zip codes (the dashed 
line). This information is reported in two panels that further subdivide application volumes by 
state-licensed lenders that specialize in subprime loans and all other lenders (labeled exempt 
lenders in the figure). These panels capture a number of key trends related to the legislation. In 
both panels there is a substantial and statistically significant drop in the number of applications 
in the treated area around the time the regulation became effective (September 1, 2006). In 
contrast, the volumes in the control area remained relatively flat for much of the HB 4050 period, 
before beginning a rapid market-wide decline in subprime mortgage originations early in 2007.
 21 
The decline in loan application volume is much more pronounced among state-licensed 
mortgage bankers specializing in subprime loans.  For such lenders, the application volume 
dropped from nearly 4,000 in August 2006 to 2,341 in September. Although this decline may 
potentially be exaggerated by the run-up of applications in anticipation of the regulation, it is 
clearly not present in the control sample. Following the repeal of HB 4050, activity levels in both 
geographic areas converged nearly instantaneously; then they proceeded to plummet jointly to 
less than one-sixth of those in the market heyday. 
Although not shown in Figure 2a, HMDA data provide additional insight into lender 
specialization.  While the vast majority of subprime lending was done by state-licensed mortgage 
                                                 
20 We count all HMDA records associated with owner-occupied properties that have one of the following action 
codes: originated, denied, approved but not taken, withdrawn, and incomplete. Purchase loans are excluded because 
of uncertainty about the timing of the initial loan application. When purchase loans are added to the set of 
applications, the time patterns are effectively unchanged. 
21 In an earlier version of the paper we examined whether house prices changed during the legislation period. Using 
a variety of home price measures, we did not detect any statistically significant change in prices. Price measures 
included logged prices, changes of market-adjusted (or unadjusted) prices since last transaction in the same property, 
and transaction prices relative to the asking prices. The results are available upon request. 
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and thus from HB 4050. This specialization, and the lack of any appreciable upward trend in the 
number of applications filed by lenders exempt from HB 4050 (the right-hand panel) are 
consistent with the scenario in which low FICO borrowers were the ones most adversely affected 
by the treatment and were not able to switch to the non-treated lenders. 
Similar results are presented in regression form in Table 2, Panel A. These regressions 
are run at the zip-code-month level. Column (1) shows a nearly 73% decline in loan application 
volume in treated zip codes among lenders most affected by the regulation. The declines are 
much smaller among other lenders, some of whom were also subject to regulation, e.g., state-
licensed lenders that originated negative amortization mortgages to prime borrowers (column 2).  
Panels B and C further differentiate between applications for mortgage refinancing and 
home purchases. Among subprime lenders, the decline in applications for refinancing is much 
greater; we attribute this to the voluntary nature of refinancing decisions versus home purchase 
financing. Home buyers who need to relocate are bound to take a mortgage; conversely, for 
existing homeowners, refinancing is an optional stand-alone action. The disparity between the 
declines in origination rates of purchase- and refinancing-related transactions is indicative of the 
extent of the burden that counseling places on borrowers. 
Some of the dramatic drop in loan applications could be traced to much publicized lender 
withdrawals. We can tackle the question of market exit by counting the number of unique lenders 
filing HMDA reports before, during, and after the treatment period in both the treated and the 
control geographic areas.  To be counted as an active lender in a given geographic area, a 
HMDA reporting institution must originate an average of at least 1 loan per week over a given 
five-month period, with at least 1 origination in every given month.
22 The results of this simple 
exercise are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The table shows a substantial decline in the number 
                                                 
22 The five-month period is chosen to match the duration of HB 4050. None of the patterns depend on the choice of 
the threshold level or geographic area. The “every month” condition is intended to eliminate lenders that withdraw 
from HB 4050 zip codes during the fall of 2006 after working off their backlog of earlier applications. We thank 
Adair Morse for this suggestion.  
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statistically different from the pattern observed in the control area. The table also confirms that 
lender exit was disproportionately concentrated among state-licensed lenders specializing in 
subprime mortgages. These results corroborate the hypothesis that the mandatory counseling 
requirement resulted not just in the reduction of demand for credit, but also in the abrupt exit of 
relatively large lenders from the affected zip codes. 
It is worth noting that some of the subprime lenders that exited the pilot areas appear to 
have returned as soon as HB 4050 was rescinded. Figure 2b illustrates the rapid run-up in loan 
applications filed by those lenders. As noted in footnote 9, the legislation created some legal 
uncertainty about enforceability of mortgage contracts in treated zips. This by itself may have 
accounted for the strong lender response along the extensive margin. 
This identification of active lenders allows us to check whether the drop off in loan 
applications in Table 2 is due entirely to lender exit. Column (3) of Table 2 shows that restricting 
the sample to lenders that remained active in the HB 4050 area still generates a substantial (albeit 
smaller) drop in volume. In other words, fewer applications were filed even with the subprime 
lenders that did not shut down their operations in HB 4050 zip codes. Applications for 
refinancing declined more, suggesting a shift to purchase loans among the remaining lenders.
23  
We further assess whether the lenders who stayed in the market have different 
characteristics than the ones that exited following implementation of HB 4050. Panel B of Table 
3 compares those two types of lenders, based on characteristics of their mortgage applications 
and originations prior to HB 4050. Two of the characteristics jump out. Lenders who remained in 
the market are much larger than those who exited. They also have much higher rejection rates 
prior to the HB 4050 period, indicating more stringent screening practices. We will return to this 
point in Section 5.5.  
                                                 
23 We count 9 state-licensed subprime lenders that satisfy this definition of active in the HB 4050 zip codes. This 
number refers to the number of lenders funding loans and filing HMDA reports. According to the Housing Action 
Illinois (2007) report, these lenders were represented by more than 300 mortgage brokers. This correspondence 
looks less surprising given the large size of entities in the active lender subset. 
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to be rationed from the market. In Figures 3a and 3b we compare the distribution of borrowers 
that originated their loans before and during the HB 4050 period across FICO ranges. There is a 
pronounced shift to the right in the FICO score distribution during the treatment period in the HB 
4050 zip codes. The share of loans originated for borrowers with sub-620 FICO scores in treated 
areas shrank by 10 percentage points relative to the pre-HB 4050 period. In contrast, the FICO 
score distribution in the comparable (untreated) sample remains virtually unchanged.  
In unreported analysis, we evaluate these changes in borrower credit quality in a 
regression framework, with one of the specifications limiting the sample to financial institutions 
that remained active in the HB 4050 zip codes during the treatment period. The restricted sample 
also shows a sizable improvement in borrower credit quality in HB 4050 zip codes, indicating 
that the change was not entirely due to the exit of lenders that catered to low-FICO borrowers. 
 
4.2 Default Rates 
Perhaps the main goal of HB 4050 was to reduce the extent to which borrowers defaulted 
and had their properties foreclosed on. To measure loan performance, we flag borrowers that 
default within 18 months of origination.
24 We then estimate a series of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions defined in (2), where the set of controls includes measures of borrower 
characteristics (FICO score and flags for being an investor or second-home owner), contract 
terms (LTV, loan spread, and logged property valuation), contract type (low-doc, negative 
amortization, interest only, prepayment penalty, or refinancing loans), and property 
characteristics (indicators of whether a property is a single-family home, condo, or townhouse).   
The results of difference-in-differences tests are reported in Table 4. Columns (1)–(4) 
display the results of specification (2) that differentiates between borrowers on the basis of their 
FICO scores. As discussed in Section 3.2, each difference-in-differences specification is 
                                                 
24 A loan is considered defaulted if it is 90+ days past due, in bankruptcy, or in foreclosure or if it has real-estate 
owned (REO) status in the first 18 months since the first mortgage payment date. 
  21estimated for four samples: the control sample, the matched sample, and the control sample and 
the matched sample restricted to lenders that remained active during the HB 4050 period. 
The results in columns (1)–(4) suggest that the treatment had a strong effect on low-
FICO-borrowers, each of whom had to attend a counseling session. For such borrowers, the ex 
post default rates are substantially lower than those among similar borrowers in the control 
group. The difference ranges from 4.1 to 5.4 percentage points across the four samples, but is 
uniformly economically and statistically significant in each of the samples.
25 In contrast, there is 
no statistically measurable effect of HB 4050 for borrowers with high or mid FICO scores. The 
results are qualitatively the same if contract type controls (which determine counseling 
requirements for mid- and high-FICO borrowers) are added as regressors—columns (5)–(8). 
The specifications in table 4 allow us to account for the possibility that the superior 
performance of counseled borrowers is due to factors other than counseling, such as changes in 
the composition of borrowers or of lenders. For instance, limiting the sample to lenders that 
remained active during the HB 4050 period (columns (3)–(4), tests whether better post-treatment 
default rates owe to the fact that predatory lenders that previously accepted unqualified 
borrowers simply exited the market after HB 4050, thereby eliminating some bad loans. The 
results indicate that our conclusions remain fully robust to this restriction. Even among loans 
made by this static group of lenders, there is a marked improvement in ex post defaults for HB 
4050 originations among low-FICO-score borrowers relative to those in either control group.  
  Another potential interpretation of the results is that risky borrowers self-selected out of 
the market or were rejected by lenders (as shown in Figures 3a and 3b). However, all of Table 4 
specifications control for borrower credit scores, implying that the improvement in performance 
is not due solely to higher FICO scores of the remaining borrowers. They also include a control 
for the loan spread paid by borrowers as an additional measure of borrower riskiness not 
                                                 
25 The weakest statistical result— for the matched active sample— has a t-statistic of 1.94. 
  22captured by the credit score.
26 The validity of these variables as risk measures is corroborated by 
the consistent association of lower FICO scores and higher loan spreads with higher defaults.  
As a test of our identification strategy, we estimate a specification with a full set of 
interactions between zip code and time dummies. This setting allows us to identify the effects of 
HB 4050 by exploiting within-zip-code heterogeneity in applicability of the counseling 
requirement. This specification represents a triple difference-in-differences estimator, with the 
additional set of differences taken with respect to performance of the omitted (high-FICO-score) 
group. The results shown in columns (1)–(4) of Panel B once again indicate a statistically and 
economically significant effect of HB 4050. To test the importance of the functional form 
assumptions, we rerun the regressions in a probit framework despite the critique of Ai and 
Norton (2003). The estimated marginal effects presented in columns (5)–(8) indicate a consistent 
treatment effect of 3–4 percentage points on defaults. 
In sum, we find that the financial counseling requirement improved ex post default rates 
for the low-FICO-score counseled borrowers relative to similar borrowers outside the treatment 
area. The effect on default is impressive in its economic magnitude and does not seem to be 
driven solely by documented changes in the borrower and lender pools.  
 
5. Disentangling the Effects of Information, Costs, and Oversight 
  Our results in the previous section show that the HB 4050 program had a strong 
contractionary effect on the mortgage market in affected zip codes. Still, the pilot program 
appears to have accomplished one of its stated goals—sharply lower default rates among some of 
the vulnerable (low-FICO-score) borrowers. In this section we analyze the factors that could 
have led to the improvement in performance. In particular, we consider changes in borrower 
ability to make better product choices or negotiate better loan terms, as well as changes in lender 
underwriting practices. We will use each of these actions to try to differentiate between the direct 
                                                 
26 For ARMs, LoanPerformance provides the relevant data item. For fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs), Loan Spread is 
calculated as the difference between the contract interest rate and the matching-maturity Treasury. 
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and the threat of regulatory or legal action. 
 
5.1 Mortgage Terms 
According to Housing Action Illinois (2007), counselors commonly observed that 
mortgage applicants took on too much debt at excessive interest rates. As a result, one would 
expect that treated borrowers would try to reduce their leverage and negotiate better loan terms. 
If the pilot program worked by providing better information through counseling sessions, its 
effects should be most pronounced in mortgage terms of the counseled borrowers. 
The top panel of Table 5 presents evidence of changes in some of the key contract terms 
of loans originated during the treatment period. For each dependent variable, we estimate 
difference-in-differences specifications for the four samples described earlier. We find a 
marginally significant decrease in LTV for the low-FICO-score borrowers (columns (1)–(2)).
27 
These relative improvements translate to a decrease in debt levels of about $1,500 for an average 
borrower. We further investigate whether interest rate spreads improved for counseled 
borrowers. Regression results show no material effect of HB 4050 on loan spreads once the 
sample is restricted to lenders that remained active during the treatment period (columns (5)–
(6)). For the broader sample, it is the mid- and high-FICO groups show statistically significant, if 
small, improvements in spreads.  
The lower panel of Table 5 explores measures of loan affordability by looking at the 
debt-service-to-income (DTI) ratio that captures borrowers’ ability to service existing loan 
obligation (columns (1)–(2)) and the dollar amount of the annual mortgage payment relative to 
the original loan size (columns (3)–(6)). For either of these measures we fail to detect any effect 
of the treatment on the low-FICO-score population. Somewhat surprisingly, we find slightly 
                                                 
27 Note that for LTV and Debt-Service-to-Income (DTI) regressions we do not present matched sample results since 
they were constructed by matching on characteristics which include LTV and DTI. 
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the magnitude of the estimated effect is very small, never exceeding 20 basis points.  
In sum, the analysis of loan terms contains only some evidence of the beneficial effects of 
information obtained in counseling sessions. Although debt burdens improve somewhat for 
counseled borrowers, the economic magnitude of these effects is fairly small. We find no 
evidence that counseled borrowers were able to negotiate lower loan spreads. Instead, it is the 
borrowers exempt from counseling that are able to obtain (slightly) better loan rates. 
 
5.2 Direct Evidence of Loan Renegotiations 
  The results in the preceding section suggest that HB 4050 did not improve the bargaining 
power of low- and mid-FICO-score borrowers. However, we can learn more about the actions of 
counseled borrowers by comparing the initial loan offers reviewed by counselors and the final 
originated loan. In particular, we assess whether counseled borrowers walked away from the 
original offer or tried to renegotiate it following the counseling session. 
  To do so, we obtain detailed counseling session information from one of the agencies 
providing services under HB 4050. For each of the 191 sessions we compared the original terms 
(as recorded by the agency) to mortgage details in LoanPerformance data set.
28 Panel A of Table 
6 presents a breakdown of these mortgage offers organized by counselor recommendation.  
About 19% of the initial mortgage offers were abandoned by the borrowers, with the 
rejection rates substantially higher among borrowers that were told that their loans were either 
“unaffordable” or “fraudulent”. The majority of the reviewed offers that proceeded to closing 
(101 out of 155) received a “no issues” entry, indicating that the counselor had no concerns 
about the loan’s affordability, the borrower’s understanding of the terms, or the original offer’s 
disclosures. Yet, about a half of these “no issues” loans did become modified after counseling, 
                                                 
28 To match counseling records with those in the LoanPerformance database, we first use the property address and 
counseling date to obtain the amount of originated loan in the Recorder of Deeds database. If there is no record of a 
mortgage transaction in the month following the counseling session, the loan offer is considered to have been 
abandoned. For matched properties we use the Deeds dataset values on loan amount and loan recording dates, and 
the agency’s data on the counseling date and applicant’s FICO score to find a matching loan in the LP data.  
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share of renegotiated “unaffordable” or “fraudulent” loans is similar to that of the “no issue” 
loans, substantially more of them result in lower monthly payments.  
Looking more closely into the specifics of renegotiated problem loans highlights some of 
the complexities in establishing a direct mapping between counseling recommendations and the 
eventual loan choice. Some contract changes appear incongruous with the recommendation. For 
example, some unaffordable loans were renegotiated to loans with shorter amortization periods 
or longer resets. This may have made such choices less risky, but also less affordable at the time 
of origination. Although counselors commonly recommended fixed rate mortgages as the best 
means to lessen the risk of mortgage obligations, few borrowers switched away from their 
original ARM offers. In fact, as many borrowers went from fixed rate mortgages to ARMs as the 
other way around. Among those renegotiating their ARM deals, extending reset periods (by 
switching from, say, 2/28 to 3/27 loans) was also nearly as common as shortening them. Thus, it 
may not be surprising that, on average, counseling did not appear to change debt burden and 
interest costs of originated mortgages substantially (Table 5).  
An open question then is whether the evidence in this small sample of treated borrowers 
is consistent with direct information effects of counseling. On the one hand, higher rejection 
rates of fraudulent loans and a high prevalence of lower payments for renegotiated unaffordable 
loans is suggestive of a strong effect of counseling. On the other, about a half of all problematic 
loans that went to origination did so without any changes. Moreover, if we assume that recorded 
recommendations reflect relevant information provided by counselors, the fact that many loan 
changes do not seem to line up with such recommendations weakens the hypothesis of direct 
information effects.   
 
5.3 Borrower Rejection of Loan Offers 
HB 4050 also required further sessions for each mortgage offer from a new lender or a 
renegotiated offer from the original lender that worsened the initial terms. Hence, if counseling is 
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rejections of loan offers by treated population. Conversely, we would expect to see a spike in 
loan rejections by better informed borrowers if they cannot renegotiate their loan terms. 
Table 6, Panel B presents a test of these hypotheses using aggregate HMDA applications 
data. The regressions are run at the loan level, with borrower rejection of a loan offer as the 
dependent variable. The table shows that rejection of mortgages by borrowers actually declined 
during the HB 4050 period by about 5 percentage points among subprime lenders. Note, 
however, that the borrower rejection rate appears to be unchanged among subprime lenders that 
remained in the HB 4050 zip codes (columns (3)–(4)). This suggests that such lenders were 
somewhat different than the ones who exited the market. 
This finding is remarkable because the majority of the counseled were advised that they 
could not afford the loan and/or that they should seek alternative mortgage offers (see discussion 
in Section 2.1). Since we find little evidence of significant improvement in loan terms following 
counseling (e.g., loan spread), a likely explanation for the decrease in the rejection rate is that 
borrowers preferred to accept the offer at hand and not to return for further counseling with 
offers from different lenders.  
This result is consistent with the idea that decisions of low-FICO-score borrowers were 
not influenced as much by information presented in counseling sessions as they were by the costs 
of obtaining an alternative loan offer. For such borrowers, the costs of compliance likely 
outweighed the expected benefits of new offers. This finding also appears to reflect the limits of 
bargaining power and ability to act on new information by this subset of borrowers. Finally, this 
result also removes concerns that the incentives of counselors led them to convince borrowers to 
reject loans, ultimately leading to low origination volume. 
 
5.4 Product Choice 
From our interviews with a number of counselors involved in HB 4050 we know that 
borrowers were typically warned about risks associated with hybrid ARM loans or loans carrying 
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provided not only through counseling sessions, but also by the fact that the legislation signaled 
certain products were risky because their selection triggered counseling. Hence, analyzing 
changes in product selection in HB 4050 zips can help us differentiate between the effects of 
counselor information, signaling, and borrowers’ desire to avoid compliance costs of counseling.  
To do this, we again estimate difference-in-differences regressions of borrower choice of 
a particular mortgage contract, omitting the set of contract controls. If the information effect is at 
work, we would expect the low-FICO-score borrowers to shift away from products highlighted 
by counselors. In the case of signaling, we would expect the incidence of risky product choices 
to decline for all FICO score groups in the treated zip codes. If product selection is driven by 
cost avoidance, members of a given FICO score group would avoid products that trigger 
counseling for their group. That is, we would expect fewer interest-only loans by mid-FICO-
score households, but not high-FICO-score ones. Similarly, we would expect both mid- and 
high-FICO-score (but not low-FICO-score) households to choose fewer negative amortization 
loans and mortgages with prepayment penalty. 
Table 7 presents the results of this exercise. Category I Risky Products denotes choices 
that subject only the mid-FICO borrowers to counseling (hybrid ARMs, interest-only loans, and 
low-documentation loans), while Category II indicates choices that trigger counseling for both 
mid- and high-FICO borrowers (prepayment penalty and negative amortization loans). As 
reported in the top panel, we find no evidence that low-FICO borrowers who always had to 
attend counseling stayed away from either of these categories of risky products at lenders that 
remained active during the pilot period. Instead, we find much lower prevalence of Category I 
products among mid-FICO borrowers in pilot areas, but not high-FICO borrowers. Although 
taking a Category II loan triggers counseling for all borrowers, only high-FICO borrowers in HB 
4050 zips reduce their use of such products. Although these results are consistent with both 
signaling and cost avoidance, they do not support the hypothesis of direct information effects.  
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materially change their product mix as a result of counseling. The ones that did alter their 
product choice appreciably were the mid- and high-FICO borrowers who would thereby be able 
to eschew counseling. In other words, the regulator achieved the goal of risk reduction by the 
threat of counseling and not by the content of counseling. 
  The results thus far point to the limited ability (or willingness) of the low-FICO-score 
borrowers to act on counseling information. Yet, we find strong evidence of improvement in 
their ex post performance. One remaining possibility is that the counseling mandate caused 
lenders to modify their behavior as well. We consider this in the following section. 
 
5.5 Changes in Lender Behavior 
In this section we analyze the response of lenders who stayed in the market to the 
increased oversight of their actions by counselors and, implicitly, by the state. If lenders are 
apprehensive of the consequences of such oversight, we would expect them to tighten their 
screening of prospective borrowers, allowing fewer doubtful cases to enter the counseling 
process. Such behavior would be reflected in a temporary spike in rejection rates among the 
affected lenders during the HB 4050 period. In the same vein, we would expect lenders affected 
by HB 4050 to cut back on offering low-documentation loans. Under HB 4050, there is little 
reason to offer such loans to any but high-FICO-score borrowers, as income and expenses 
information would be gathered during counseling and then furnished to the state-run database. 
The simple time series of Figure 4a indeed show a dramatic spike in the rejection rates of 
state-licensed mortgage bankers issuing subprime loans in the pilot area. This does not occur 
among similar lenders in control areas or among lenders exempt from HB 4050. This spike 
comes from two sources: exit of loosely screening lenders and further tightening of underwriting 
standards by the ones that remain active during HB 4050.  
The first source is illustrated by the time series in Figure 4b that show the decomposition 
of lender rejection rates in the HB 4050 area between active and non-active lenders, as defined in 
  29Section 4.1. The subprime lenders that ultimately remained active experienced a very fast run-up 
in their rejection rates in the 6 months prior to implementation of HB 4050. During this time, 
their rejection rates went from about 30 percent to 50 percent (solid line, left panel) while their 
application volumes remained unchanged (Figure 2b). In contrast, the lenders that left the HB 
4050 zip codes kept rejecting applications at just above the 20 percent rate (the dashed line, left 
panel), and then left the market altogether. Consequently, as seen in the figure, the total rejection 
rate spikes with the onset of HB 4050, as the lenders with tighter screening are the only ones left. 
The rejection rate comes down when HB 4050 is rescinded as the lenders with looser screening 
practices return to the market (Figure 2b).  
The further tightening of lending standards by the lenders that stayed in the pilot zip 
codes is captured by the regression results in Table 8. As seen in columns (3)–(4) of Panel A, the 
rejection rates rise by an additional 3.4 to 3.9 percentage points among active subprime lenders. 
When we do not restrict the regression sample to such lenders, the spike in rejection rates is 
greater, in line with the decomposition in Figure 4b.  
Earlier we found that state-licensed lenders that specialize in subprime loans were more 
likely to exit the market than lenders exempt from HB 4050. One possible explanation for lender 
exit is inability to make a profit in the presence of the $300 counseling fee. If this were the case, 
we would expect to see greater lender rejection of low-dollar-value loans, since lender 
compensation is roughly proportional to the value of originated loans. We test this hypothesis by 
testing whether smaller loans (measured as logged mortgage size) are more likely to be rejected 
during the HB 4050 treatment. Table 8, Panel B, shows that there is no empirical support for this 
hypothesis: small mortgages were not subject to higher rejection rate. 
Finally, we look at changes in availability of low-documentation loans under the 
counseling mandate. The results, reported in the panel B of Table 7, indeed show substantially 
lower likelihood of low-doc mortgages for both low- and mid-FICO-score borrowers. This is not 
surprising, since document review by counselors made such loan offers difficult to defend.  
 
  306. Policy Discussion and Conclusion 
 Mandated  financial  counseling and increased oversight of lenders (anti-predatory 
legislation) are important policy tools being considered for implementation following the 
meltdown of the housing market in 2007-2008.
29 Both policies impose restrictions on free 
contracting between borrowers and lenders. As such, they can be expected to shrink credit 
markets, in particular for the financially disadvantaged segments of the population.  
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of one such pilot legislative program implemented 
in parts of Chicago in late 2006. The design of the pilot allows us to disentangle the effects of 
financial education on the behavior of borrowers from those of increased oversight on lenders.  
Our main results show that the legislation had material effects on market composition of 
both lenders and borrowers, on borrower default rates, and on borrowers’ and lenders’ behavior. 
We find that the pilot caused low-FICO borrowers and lenders with relatively lax approval 
standards to exit the market.
30 Yet, controlling for observable characteristics of the remaining 
borrowers and holding the sample of lenders constant, we find that mortgage default rates among 
low-FICO-score counseled borrowers declined dramatically. Loan terms for counseled borrowers 
improved as well, albeit only marginally. While the product choice for the low-FICO borrowers 
did not change appreciably (the borrower group always subject to counseling), we find that mid- 
and high-FICO borrowers switched toward products that did not subject them to counseling. 
Our results are consistent with the explanation that in this specific implementation of a 
mortgage counseling mandate, the threat of third-party oversight and the desire to avoid the costs 
of counseling had a greater impact on borrowers and lenders than the informational content of 
counseling as such. We find that borrowers altered their mortgage choice to minimize interaction 
with counselors. Specifically, borrowers who could eschew counseling did so by choosing less 
                                                 
29 As announced on June 17, 2009, by President Obama, a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency will be 
created to protect consumers across the financial sector from unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices. See 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/reform.pdf. 
30 Arguably, the extent of market exit by lenders could have been mitigated by a more careful design of compliance 
rules. For instance, Bates and Van Zandt (2007) argue that the decline in the supply of credit in the HB 4050 area 
was related to the absence of the “safe harbor” provision in the legislation and the resulting uncertainty about lender 
ability to foreclose on the assets. 
  31risky products. Those who were required to attend counseling did not appear, on average, to 
follow the counselor’s advice, and seemed to have only limited bargaining power in 
renegotiations. They also tended to not walk away from the original offer following counseling 
and reapply for a restructured mortgage, which would have required another counseling session. 
Furthermore, we find evidence consistent with lenders rejecting borrowers more often based on 
unobservable characteristics when loan proposals were reviewed by third-party counselors. In 
order to avoid public scrutiny, lenders appear to have fine-tuned their lending model and rejected 
applications they may have previously accepted. Thus, it was the forced disclosure of lender 
information and its collection and recording by an outside party that generated the desired result.  
It may be tempting to conduct a back-of-the-envelope welfare analysis by linking the 
estimates of reductions in defaults with the costs of such defaults and of counseling itself.
31 
However, doing so will fail to take into account a number of important effects—losses in utility 
incurred by excluded borrowers, positive spillovers on neighborhood property values from lower 
defaults, losses from inefficient contract choices guided by avoidance of counseling sessions, and 
many others. Moreover, evaluating the overall welfare effect of this intervention requires 
weighing the benefits of fewer foreclosures against changes in utility incurred by the excluded 
borrowers and lenders.
32 It is further complicated by the various distortions that already exist in 
the housing market resulting from unique tax treatment, zoning restrictions, etc., as well as 
potential externalities produced by individual housing decisions.  
Our results suggest several policy recommendations. First, this paper shows that 
counseling is perceived as a burden by borrowers. Hence, many borrowers either stay away from 
                                                 
31 For instance, we could have noted that the average house value in the treated area during the treatment period was 
about $190,000 and that the expected deadweight loss due to foreclosure can be assumed to be about 30% 
(Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak 2009). Using the point estimate of a 5.04% improvement in default rates of the low-
FICO-score borrowers (relative to the counterfactual of the control group in column 1 of Table 4), we could 
compute the expected benefit of counseling as $2,850 (0.05*$190,000*30%). Since approximately 60% of all 
counseled borrowers had low FICO scores, their gains would have to be offset by the $300 counseling fee charged 
to all counseled borrowers.  
32 Some recent attempts to theoretically model the welfare effects of policy choices in household financial markets; 
see Carlin and Gervais (2008), Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2007), and Carlin (2008). 
  32the market altogether (as in the case of refinancing versus home-purchasing mortgages) or switch 
to mortgages that allow them to avoid counseling. Second, the gains from the informational 
content of counseling are tempered by the limited negotiating power of the borrowers. A likely 
possibility is that even after the (admittedly brief) counseling session mortgage applicants cannot 
negotiate well with mortgage brokers who steer them between products, without real 
improvement in the loan terms for the borrower. Furthermore, in the current set-up borrowers 
have a disincentive to shop for alternative mortgage proposals, given that they need to incur new 
application fees. A potential remedy that would improve borrowers’ negotiating leverage would 
be to require lenders to reimburse borrowers for their upfront application fee if they change their 
minds following counseling. Third, the mere presence of the regulator in the marketplace and the 
third-party review of mortgages seem to have a large effect on the quality of mortgages 
originated. We observe that lenders with looser screening criteria exit the market, and the 
remaining lenders cut back substantially on origination of low-documentation loans. 
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  35Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Construction of a Control Sample on the Basis of pre-Treatment Socioeconomic 
Characteristics  
(2005 IRS and 2000 Census data) 
HB 4050 zip codes Control ZIP codes
all non-HB4050 
Chicago zip codes
(10 zip codes) (12 zip codes) (53 zip codes)
Total population 729,980 713,155 2,181,267
Total number of 2005 tax returns 259,884 244,326 888,354
Share of minority households* 0.813 0.863 0.505
Share of households below poverty level* 0.200 0.245 0.174
Average taxable income in 2005
# $31,579 $30,844 $56,976
Share of households with income < $50,000 in 2005 0.823 0.837 0.720
Unemployment rate (2000 Census)* 0.141 0.151 0.101
* population-weighted averages
# weighted by number of 2005 IRS tax returns  
 
           
 
Panel B: Pre-Treatment Mortgage Market and Borrower Characteristics of HB 4050 and 
Control Zip Codes  








I(Default within 18 months) (x 100) 14.01 13.69 9.06
FICO 627.68 628.64 648.77
LTV (%) 84.14 82.92 81.85
Debt Service-to-Income (%) 39.94 40.28 40.20
log(Valuation) 12.12 12.22 12.47
 




HB 4050 Control Matched HB 4050 Control Matched
Zip Codes Sample Sample Zip Codes Sample Sample
n = 24,014 n = 20,686 n = 24,014 n = 2,802 n = 4,445 n = 2,802
I(Default within 18 months) x 100 17.36 17.29 15.03 21.66 25.47 20.92
Low FICO Borrowers 44.14 44.21 40.69 35.58 42.32 36.54
Mid-FICO Borrowers 19.93 19.57 20.79 20.91 20.13 20.74
High-FICO Borrowers 35.93 36.22 38.52 43.50 37.55 42.73
Risky Products Category I 88.39 88.43 91.36 81.66 84.52 86.23
Risky Products Category II 20.34 20.10 18.05 13.20 15.84 15.15
I(Low Doc) x 100 44.66 45.62 49.94 46.57 48.03 51.90
FICO 629.66 629.92 634.19 641.19 632.39 639.90
M a r g i n  ( % ) 4 . 6 94 . 7 04 . 7 74 . 3 34 . 5 74 . 5 4
Annual Mortgage Payment (%) 8.55 8.49 8.34 8.66 8.58 8.42
Loan-to-Value (%) 84.20 83.01 83.91 83.32 82.67 83.66
Debt-Service-to-Income (%) 40.46 40.85 41.07 40.32 41.28 41.02
log(House Value ($)) 12.15 12.23 12.33 12.29 12.37 12.32
1/2005-8/2006 9/2006-12/2007
  37Table 2.  Effects of HB 4050 on Market Activity: Application and Transaction Volume 





State-Licensed Other State-Licensed Other
Subprime Lenders Lenders Subprime Lenders Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HB 4050 -0.727*** -0.072*** -0.113*** 0.002
(-0.038) (-0.02) (-0.036) (-0.023)
M o n t h  F E Y e sY e s Y e sY e s
Month FE x log(Avg Income) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 792 792 792 792
Adj. R
2 0.98 0.975 0.959 0.97
HB 4050 -0.663*** -0.108*** -0.112** -0.006
(-0.041) (-0.029) (-0.051) (-0.031)
M o n t h  F E Y e sY e s Y e sY e s
Month FE x log(Avg Income) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 784 792 779 792
Adj. R
2 0.955 0.905 0.92 0.879
HB 4050 -0.788*** -0.059** -0.083 0.005
(-0.049) (-0.022) (-0.057) (-0.026)
M o n t h  F E Y e sY e s Y e sY e s
Month FE x log(Avg Income) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 792 792 791 792
Adj. R
2 0.968 0.976 0.921 0.969
Panel C: Dependent: log(# Originated Refinancing-Related Mortgages)
All Lenders Active Lenders
Panel A: Dependent: log(# Applications)
Panel B: Dependent: log(# Originated Purchase-Related Mortgages)
  38Table 3.  Effects of HB 4050 on Credit Supply 
 
Panel A: Supply of Credit -- Total Number of Active
# Lenders (Source: HMDA) 
  
    
HB 4050 Control HB 4050 Control
Before HB 4050 (9/05 - 8/06) 31 30 83 76
During HB 4050 (9/06 - 1/07) 9      23*** 56 65
After HB 4050 (2/07 - 6/07) 13 15 66 66
State-Licensed Lenders
 Specializing in Subprime loans All Other Lenders
 
# Active lenders are defined as those that originate an average of at least 1 loan per week over a given five-month 
period, with at least 1 origination in every given month. 
*** means statistically different from the number of active lenders in HB 4050 zip codes at 1 percent level. 
 
 
Panel B: Which Lenders Stayed in the Market?
# 
(Pre-HB 4050 characteristics: January 2006 – August 2006) 
 
 
# Mean lender characteristics averaged across lenders in a given group (stayed in the market, left the market) 
Mean Median Mean Median
Mortgage Amount 147.9 147.0 144.4 147.6
Income 72.8 70.8 76.4 72.4
Total Originations 459.4 169.0 231.2 126.0
Refi (%) 50.0 51.1 56.6 53.0
Rejection Rate (%) 33.4 33.8 27.9 27.2
Lien Ratio (%) 22.4 19.8 19.8 18.9
Stayed in Market (n = 9) Left Market (n = 21)
*
* The summary statistics are based on 1/2006 to 8/2006. Two lenders did not lend in this period.
  39Table 4. Effects of HB 4050 on Mortgage Performance 
 





Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active Active Active
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HB 4050 x Low FICO -5.04** -4.72** -5.39** -4.11* -4.75** -4.34** -5.19** -3.85*
(1.97) (1.88) (2.26) (2.12) (1.96) (1.88) (2.26) (2.12)
HB 4050 x Mid FICO 0.12 1.23 0.43 2.34 0.50 1.67 0.84 2.81
(2.65) (2.66) (2.59) (2.50) (2.60) (2.61) (2.54) (2.44)
HB 4050 x High FICO -1.48 -0.27 -1.25 0.77 -1.58 -0.44 -1.33 0.60
(1.43) (1.44) (1.49) (1.39) (1.45) (1.46) (1.51) (1.41)
FICO -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Margin (%) 1.77*** 1.54*** 1.68*** 1.46*** 1.72*** 1.43*** 1.61*** 1.35***
(0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14)
Contract Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
C o n t r a c t  T e r m s  C o n t r o l s Y e sY e sY e sY e s Y e sY e sY e sY e s
B o r r o w e r  C o n t r o l s Y e sY e sY e sY e s Y e sY e sY e sY e s
P r o p e r t y  T y p e  C o n t r o l s Y e sY e sY e sY e s Y e sY e sY e sY e s
Z i p  C o d e Y e sY e sY e sY e s Y e sY e sY e sY e s
M o n t h  F E Y e sY e sY e sY e s Y e sY e sY e sY e s
Month FE * log(Avg Income) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55600 57619 40041 40425 55600 57619 40041 40425
Adj. R
2 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09
Dependent variable: I(Default within 18 months) (x 100)
Rergression: OLS
The set of controls not shown in the table includes the following variables: contract type (flags for low doc loans, 
negative amortization loan, interest only loan, loan with a prepayment penalty, refinance loan, cashout refinance); 
contract terms (log of appraised value, LTV ratio); borrower characteristics (FICO score range (low- and mid-), 
investor and second mortgage flags); and property type (flags for single family residence, townhouse, or 
condominium). All standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. 
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Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active Active Active
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HB 4050 x Low FICO -5.20*** -3.90** -5.35** -3.90** -0.040***-0.032** -0.042** -0.034**
(1.72) (1.66) (1.96) (1.88) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
HB 4050 x Mid FICO 0.49 2.55 0.93 3.11 0.002 0.017 0.004 0.016
(2.87) (2.61) (2.77) (2.47) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
HB 4050 x High FICO -0.003 0.018 -0.002 0.016
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
FICO -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Margin (%) 1.71*** 1.46*** 1.63*** 1.34*** 0.020***0.017***0.019***0.017***
(0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
B o r r o w e r  C o n t r o l s Y e sY e sY e sY e s Y e sY e sY e sY e s
C o n t r a c t  T e r m s  C o n t r o l s Y e sY e sY e sY e s Y e sY e sY e sY e s
P r o p e r t y  T y p e  C o n t r o l s Y e sY e sY e sY e s Y e sY e sY e sY e s
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE * log(Avg Income) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code * Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55600 57619 40041 39935 55600 48114 40041 40416
Adj. R
2 (pseudo R
2) 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.110 0.105 0.111 0.105
Regression: Probit
I(Default within 18 months)
Regression: OLS
 
The set of controls not shown in the table includes the following variables: contract terms (log of appraised value, 
LTV ratio); borrower characteristics (FICO score range (low- and mid-), investor and second mortgage flags); and 
property type (flags for single family residence, townhouse, or condominium). All standard errors are clustered at 




  41Table 5. Effects of HB 4050 on Mortgage Leverage and Spread 
 
Panel A: Key Mortgage Terms (Source: LoanPerformance) 
     
Control Control Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active Active
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HB 4050 x Low FICO -0.75* -0.81* -7.64** -2.49 -3.06 5.10
(0.41) (0.42) (3.01) (3.35) (3.16) (3.16)
HB 4050 x Mid FICO -0.12 -0.24 -13.53***-11.37*** -4.71 0.22
(0.37) (0.38) (4.04) (3.75) (4.64) (3.95)
HB 4050 x High FICO -0.02 0.13 -16.92***-15.55*** -5.60 -2.87
(0.37) (0.41) (4.23) (4.20) (4.32) (4.45)
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contract Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE, Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE * log(Avg Income) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55,600 40,041 55,600 57,619 40,041 40,425
Adj. R
2 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21
Loan-to-Value (%) Margin (bp)
 
Panel B: Mortgage Affordability (Source: LoanPerformance) 
    
Control Control Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active Active
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HB 4050 x Low FICO -0.49 -0.31 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02
(0.41) (0.42) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
HB 4050 x Mid FICO -0.34 -0.41 0.13* 0.16** 0.13* 0.13*
(0.71) (0.74) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
HB 4050 x High FICO -0.05 0.07 0.07** 0.17*** 0.06* 0.12***
(0.40) (0.38) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contract Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE, Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE * log(Avg Income) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40,024 26,604 55,600 57,619 40,041 40,425
Adj. R
2 0.07 0.08 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.23
Debt-Service-to-
Income (%) Annual Mortgage Payment (%)
 
The set of controls not shown in the table includes: borrower characteristics (FICO score and FICO score ranges, 
investor and second mortgage flags); contract terms (LTV (only for margin and  mortgage payment regressions) and 
log of appraised value); and property type (flags for single family residence, townhouse, or condominium). All 
standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.  
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market rate / 
Seek another bid
Number of counseling sessions 191 117 39 25 10
Loans not pursued after counseling 36 17 10 8 1
memo: abandoned loans re-originated after HB 4050 1 4 734 0
Share of loans not pursued after counseling 19% 15% 26% 32% 10%
Loans originated after counseling 155 101 28 17 9
Total matched originations 148 96 27 17 8
No changes at all 73 49 14 8 2
Loans with changes post counseling 75 47 13 9 6
(percent with changes) 49% 48% 53% 75%
Lower monthly payments 20 10 5 5
 (percent of all changed loans) 43% 77% 56% 83%
Switch from ARM to fixed 8 5 4 1
 (percent of all changed loans) 17% 38% 44% 17%
Switch from fixed to ARM 12 3 1 2
 (percent of all changed loans) 26% 23% 11% 33%
Lower interest rate 23 11 5 5
 (percent of all changed loans) 49% 85% 56% 83%
Counselor recommendation
Comparison of loan terms before and after counseling sessions
Panel B: Are Applicants More Likely to Reject Mortgage Offers? (Source: HMDA) 
 
 
Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active Active Active
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HB 4050 -5.38*** -4.75*** -0.85 -0.43 -1.68** -0.98 0.17 0.04
(0.68) (0.73) (0.77) (1.00) (0.60) (0.65) (0.72) (0.69)
log(Mortgage) 0.64* 0.35 0.03 -0.28 2.54*** 2.20*** 2.16*** 1.89***
(0.36) (0.38) (0.56) (0.52) (0.35) (0.29) (0.25) (0.24)
log(Income) 2.44*** 2.79*** 1.01*** 0.54* 1.00*** 0.64*** 0.04 -0.22
(0.29) (0.30) (0.22) (0.28) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.18)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE x log(income) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 158307 168789 56900 61929 236007 269138 155002 179842
Adj. R
2 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
State-Licensed Lenders (Subprime) All Other Lenders
Dependent: I(Applicant Rejects Offer) x 100
  43Table 7. Mortgage Product Choice 
 




Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active Active Active
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HB 4050 x Low FICO -2.90** -3.04** -2.04 -1.36 -0.40 -1.91 -1.67 -2.31
(1.36) (1.44) (1.59) (1.56) (1.79) (1.86) (1.79) (1.85)
HB 4050 x Mid FICO -5.28*** -5.07*** -6.67*** -5.80*** -0.15 -1.57 -1.04 -1.47
(1.27) (1.24) (1.44) (1.28) (1.27) (1.42) (1.14) (1.22)
HB 4050 x High FICO 0.37 0.87 -0.99 0.39 -3.95*** -5.76*** -4.37*** -5.17***
(1.15) (1.20) (1.31) (1.27) (1.34) (1.44) (1.26) (1.30)
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contract Terms Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE, Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE * log(Avg Income) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55600 57619 40041 41891 55600 57619 40041 41891
Adj. R
2 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06
I(Risky Products: Category I) x 100 I(Risky Products: Category II) x 100
 
Panel B: Availability of Low-Doc Loans (Source: LoanPerformance) 
 
Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HB 4050 x Low FICO -5.48*** -7.55*** -4.03** -5.23**
(1.76) (1.99) (1.89) (2.04)
HB 4050 x Mid FICO -7.26*** -8.61*** -7.17*** -8.03***
(2.24) (2.27) (2.41) (2.48)
HB 4050 x High FICO 0.72 1.98 1.12 3.26*
(1.36) (1.43) (1.58) (1.71)
Borrower Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contract Terms Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Type Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE, Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE * log(Avg Income) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55600 57619 40041 40425
Adj. R
2 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.18
I(Low Doc) x 100
 
  44Table 8. Lender Rejection Behavior 
 
Panel A: Were Lenders More Likely to Reject Mortgages? (Source: HMDA) 
 
Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active Active Active
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
HB 4050 11.15***11.33***3.93*** 3.44*** 3.25*** 2.45*** 1.52** 1.28
(1.37) (1.22) (1.26) (1.23) (0.63) (0.73) (0.66) (0.82)
log(Mortgage) 0.41 -3.57***-1.31*** 0.18 -2.91***-6.18***-2.87***-6.98***
(0.27) (0.32) (0.32) (0.61) (0.26) (0.35) (0.28) (0.38)
log(Income) -3.67*** -0.25 -1.04 -1.83*** -6.58***-3.35***-7.40***-3.44***
(0.35) (0.28) (0.62) (0.33) (0.36) (0.22) (0.41) (0.25)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE x log(income) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE x log(income) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 158307 168789 56900 61929 236007 269138 155002 179842
Adj. R
2 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
Dependent: I(Lender Rejects Application) x 100
State-Licensed Lenders
 Specializing in Subprime loans All Other Lenders
 
 
Panel B: Were Small Loans More Likely to Be Rejected? (Source: HMDA) 
 
Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active Active Active
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
HB 4050 -2.51 -4.72 -4.52 -2.53 2.90 1.95 4.48 4.11
(6.18) (6.02) (7.92) (7.32) (3.33) (3.07) (3.42) (3.29)
log(Mortgage) -3.81*** -0.24 -1.00 -2.05*** -6.61***-3.36***-7.38***-3.43***
(0.34) (0.28) (0.64) (0.32) (0.36) (0.22) (0.40) (0.25)
  x HB 4050 -0.85 -0.26 2.07 2.54** -0.30 0.09 -0.44 -0.06
(1.02) (1.12) (1.23) (1.24) (0.53) (0.47) (0.56) (0.52)
log(Income) 0.44 -3.72***-1.50*** 0.32 -2.89***-6.18***-2.84***-6.93***
(0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.62) (0.27) (0.35) (0.29) (0.37)
  x HB 4050 4.28** 4.16** -0.40 -1.55 0.43 0.02 -0.23 -0.62
(1.72) (1.70) (1.72) (1.71) (0.74) (0.73) (0.78) (0.77)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE x log(income) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE x log(income) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 158307 168789 56900 61929 236007 269138 155002 179842
Adj. R
2 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
Dependent: I(Lender Rejects Application) x 100
All Other Lenders
State-Licensed Lenders
 Specializing in Subprime loans





  46Figure 2a. Number of HMDA Loan Application Filings in HB 4050 and Control Areas:  






































































































































































































































































































Figure 2b. Number of HMDA Loan Application Filings in HB 4050 Area:  








































































































































































































































































































  47Figure 3a. Cumulative Distribution of FICO Scores of Mortgages 



















































Figure 3b. Cumulative Distribution of FICO Scores of Mortgages Originated 
























































  48 
Figure 4a. Shares of HMDA-Reported Applications Rejected by Lenders: 




























































































































































































































































































































Figure 4b. Shares of HMDA-Reported Applications Rejected by Lenders: 






























































































































































































































































































































  49Appendix A. An alternative evaluation of HB 4050 effects on default rates 
 
As mentioned in footnote 16, an alternative identification of treatment across borrower 
groups can be based on both the FICO score and observed product choice. Specifically, we label 
all low-FICO borrowers as being subject to “counseling by mandate”. Higher-FICO borrowers 
had to go to counseling only if they chose certain mortgage contracts. These borrowers are 
labeled as being subject to “counseling by choice”. Finally, transactions that involved neither 
risky borrowers nor risky products are “exempt from counseling.” The results from estimating 
the default regressions with treatment dummy interacted with these borrower groups are shown 
below. In every other respect, these regressions are identical to those in Table 4.  
The results in the first four columns suggest that for the set of counseled borrowers as a 
whole, the treatment produced only a statistically insignificant improvement. The partitioning of 
the treated into the mandatory and voluntary subsets (columns (1)–(8)) makes the picture clearer. 
Those who could not avoid counseling had much better ex post performance, while the other 
group had insignificantly higher default rates. As shown in section 5.4, contract choices for the 
higher-FICO-score borrowers changed in response to the treatment, making those receiving 
treatment different from their counterparts in the control groups. This endogeneity in treatment 
selection is the primary reason why we chose to base the analysis in the paper on FICO score 




Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched Control Matched
Active Active Active Active
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HB 4050 x Counseled -2.49 -1.96 -2.61 -1.16
(1.99) (1.96) (2.19) (2.08)
HB 4050 x Mandatory Counseling -5.14** -4.75** -5.42** -4.09*
(1.91) (1.82) (2.20) (2.06)
HB 4050 x Voluntary Counseling 1.83 2.67 2.14 3.91
(2.77) (2.78) (2.77) (2.67)
HB 4050 x Exempt -2.21 -0.93 -2.06 -0.05 -2.21 -0.90 -2.06 -0.01
(1.32) (1.31) (1.43) (1.31) (1.32) (1.32) (1.43) (1.32)
Within Counseling Criteria 0.77* 1.12*** 0.74* 0.92** 0.63 0.97** 0.54 0.71*
(0.43) (0.38) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41) (0.37) (0.40) (0.40)
……….. … … … … … … … …
Observations 55,600 57,619 40,041 40,425 55,600 57,619 40,041 40,425
Adj. R
2 (pseudo R
2) 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09
Dependent variable: I(Default within 18 months) (x 100)
Rergression: OLS
  501 
Working Paper Series 
 
A series of research studies on regional economic issues relating to the Seventh Federal 
Reserve District, and on financial and economic topics. 
 
U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation  WP-06-01 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter  WP-06-02 
Marco Bassetto and Jess Benhabib 
 
Identification of Search Models with Initial Condition Problems  WP-06-03 
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja 
 
Tax Riots  WP-06-04 
Marco Bassetto and Christopher Phelan 
 
The Tradeoff between Mortgage Prepayments and Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings  WP-06-05 
Gene Amromin, Jennifer Huang,and Clemens Sialm 
 
Why are safeguards needed in a trade agreement?  WP-06-06 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth  WP-06-07 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
A New Social Compact: How University Engagement Can Fuel Innovation  WP-06-08 
Laura Melle, Larry Isaak, and Richard Mattoon  
 
Mergers and Risk  WP-06-09 
Craig H. Furfine and Richard J. Rosen 
 
Two Flaws in Business Cycle Accounting  WP-06-10 
Lawrence J. Christiano and Joshua M. Davis 
 
Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?  WP-06-11 
Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles 
 
Chronicles of a Deflation Unforetold  WP-06-12 
François R. Velde 
 
Female Offenders Use of Social Welfare Programs Before and After Jail and Prison: 
Does Prison Cause Welfare Dependency?  WP-06-13 
Kristin F. Butcher and Robert J. LaLonde 
 
Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Firm Size  WP-06-14 
Gary Gorton, Matthias Kahl, and Richard Rosen 
 
   2 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
Do Bonds Span Volatility Risk in the U.S. Treasury Market? 
A Specification Test for Affine Term Structure Models  WP-06-15 
Torben G. Andersen and Luca Benzoni 
 
Transforming Payment Choices by Doubling Fees on the Illinois Tollway  WP-06-16 
Gene Amromin, Carrie Jankowski, and Richard D. Porter 
 
How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?  WP-06-17 
Gene Amromin, Paul Harrison, and Steven Sharpe 
 
Will Writing and Bequest Motives: Early 20th Century Irish Evidence  WP-06-18 
Leslie McGranahan 
 
How Professional Forecasters View Shocks to GDP  WP-06-19 
Spencer D. Krane 
 
Evolving Agglomeration in the U.S. auto supplier industry  WP-06-20 
Thomas Klier and Daniel P. McMillen 
 
Mortality, Mass-Layoffs, and Career Outcomes: An Analysis using Administrative Data  WP-06-21 
Daniel Sullivan and Till von Wachter 
 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures:  
Tying One’s Hand through the WTO.  WP-06-22 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
How Did Schooling Laws Improve Long-Term Health and Lower Mortality?  WP-06-23 
Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
Manufacturing Plants’ Use of Temporary Workers: An Analysis Using Census Micro Data  WP-06-24 
Yukako Ono and Daniel Sullivan 
 
What Can We Learn about Financial Access from U.S. Immigrants?  WP-06-25 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Bank Imputed Interest Rates: Unbiased Estimates of Offered Rates?  WP-06-26 
Evren Ors and Tara Rice 
 
Welfare Implications of the Transition to High Household Debt  WP-06-27 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics  WP-06-28 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Oligopoly Dynamics with Barriers to Entry  WP-06-29 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Risk Taking and the Quality of Informal Insurance: Gambling and Remittances in Thailand  WP-07-01 
Douglas L. Miller and Anna L. Paulson 
 3 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
Fast Micro and Slow Macro: Can Aggregation Explain the Persistence of Inflation?  WP-07-02 
Filippo Altissimo, Benoît Mojon, and Paolo Zaffaroni 
 
Assessing a Decade of Interstate Bank Branching  WP-07-03 
Christian Johnson and Tara Rice 
 
Debit Card and Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Analysis  WP-07-04 
Gene Amromin and Sujit Chakravorti 
 
The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions Over the Lifecycle  WP-07-05 
Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and David Laibson 
 
Information Acquisition in Financial Markets: a Correction  WP-07-06 
Gadi Barlevy and Pietro Veronesi 
 
Monetary Policy, Output Composition and the Great Moderation  WP-07-07 
Benoît Mojon 
 
Estate Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth  WP-07-08 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Conflict of Interest and Certification in the U.S. IPO Market  WP-07-09 
Luca Benzoni and Carola Schenone 
 
The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to Tax Rebates – 
Evidence from Consumer Credit Data  WP-07-10 
Sumit Agarwal, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles 
 
Portfolio Choice over the Life-Cycle when the Stock and Labor Markets are Cointegrated  WP-07-11 
Luca Benzoni, Pierre Collin-Dufresne, and Robert S. Goldstein 
 
Nonparametric Analysis of Intergenerational Income Mobility   WP-07-12 
with Application to the United States 
Debopam Bhattacharya and Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
How the Credit Channel Works: Differentiating the Bank Lending Channel  WP-07-13 
and the Balance Sheet Channel 
Lamont K. Black and Richard J. Rosen 
 
Labor Market Transitions and Self-Employment  WP-07-14 
Ellen R. Rissman 
 
First-Time Home Buyers and Residential Investment Volatility  WP-07-15 
Jonas D.M. Fisher and Martin Gervais 
 
Establishments Dynamics and Matching Frictions in Classical Competitive Equilibrium  WP-07-16 
Marcelo Veracierto 
 
Technology’s Edge: The Educational Benefits of Computer-Aided Instruction  WP-07-17 
Lisa Barrow, Lisa Markman, and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 4 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
The Widow’s Offering: Inheritance, Family Structure, and the Charitable Gifts of Women  WP-07-18 
Leslie McGranahan 
 
Demand Volatility and the Lag between the Growth of Temporary   
and Permanent Employment  WP-07-19 
Sainan Jin, Yukako Ono, and Qinghua Zhang 
 
A Conversation with 590 Nascent Entrepreneurs  WP-07-20 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Cyclical Dumping and US Antidumping Protection: 1980-2001  WP-07-21 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Health Capital and the Prenatal Environment:  
The Effect of Maternal Fasting During Pregnancy  WP-07-22 
Douglas Almond and Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
The Spending and Debt Response to Minimum Wage Hikes  WP-07-23 
Daniel Aaronson, Sumit Agarwal, and Eric French 
 
The Impact of Mexican Immigrants on U.S. Wage Structure  WP-07-24 
Maude Toussaint-Comeau 
 
A Leverage-based Model of Speculative Bubbles  WP-08-01 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
Displacement, Asymmetric Information and Heterogeneous Human Capital  WP-08-02 
Luojia Hu and Christopher Taber 
 
BankCaR (Bank Capital-at-Risk): A credit risk model for US commercial bank charge-offs  WP-08-03 
Jon Frye and Eduard Pelz 
 
Bank Lending, Financing Constraints and SME Investment  WP-08-04 
Santiago Carbó-Valverde, Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández, and Gregory F. Udell 
 
Global Inflation  WP-08-05 
Matteo Ciccarelli and Benoît Mojon 
 
Scale and the Origins of Structural Change  WP-08-06 
Francisco J. Buera and Joseph P. Kaboski 
 
Inventories, Lumpy Trade, and Large Devaluations  WP-08-07 
George Alessandria, Joseph P. Kaboski, and Virgiliu Midrigan 
 
School Vouchers and Student Achievement: Recent Evidence, Remaining Questions  WP-08-08 
Cecilia Elena Rouse and Lisa Barrow 
 
   5 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
Does It Pay to Read Your Junk Mail? Evidence of the Effect of Advertising on 
Home Equity Credit Choices  WP-08-09 
Sumit Agarwal and Brent W. Ambrose 
The Choice between Arm’s-Length and Relationship Debt: Evidence from eLoans  WP-08-10 
Sumit Agarwal and Robert Hauswald 
 
Consumer Choice and Merchant Acceptance of Payment Media  WP-08-11 
Wilko Bolt and Sujit Chakravorti 
 
Investment Shocks and Business Cycles  WP-08-12 
Alejandro Justiniano, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti 
 
New Vehicle Characteristics and the Cost of the  
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard  WP-08-13 
Thomas Klier and Joshua Linn 
 
Realized Volatility  WP-08-14 
Torben G. Andersen and Luca Benzoni 
 
Revenue Bubbles and Structural Deficits: What’s a state to do?  WP-08-15 
Richard Mattoon and Leslie McGranahan 
 
The role of lenders in the home price boom  WP-08-16 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Bank Crises and Investor Confidence  WP-08-17 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Life Expectancy and Old Age Savings  WP-08-18 
Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones 
 
Remittance Behavior among New U.S. Immigrants  WP-08-19 
Katherine Meckel 
 
Birth Cohort and the Black-White Achievement Gap:  
The Roles of Access and Health Soon After Birth  WP-08-20 
Kenneth Y. Chay, Jonathan Guryan, and Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
Public Investment and Budget Rules for State vs. Local Governments  WP-08-21 
Marco Bassetto 
 
Why Has Home Ownership Fallen Among the Young?  WP-09-01 
Jonas D.M. Fisher and Martin Gervais 
 
Why do the Elderly Save? The Role of Medical Expenses  WP-09-02 
Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones 
 
Using Stock Returns to Identify Government Spending Shocks  WP-09-03 
Jonas D.M. Fisher and Ryan Peters 
   6 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
Stochastic Volatility  WP-09-04 
Torben G. Andersen and Luca Benzoni 
 
The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply  WP-09-05 
Eric French and Jae Song 
 
CEO Overconfidence and Dividend Policy  WP-09-06 
Sanjay Deshmukh, Anand M. Goel, and Keith M. Howe 
 
Do Financial Counseling Mandates Improve Mortgage Choice and Performance?   WP-09-07 
Evidence from a Legislative Experiment   
Sumit Agarwal,Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet, 
and Douglas D. Evanoff 
 